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Abstract.
Physical models have long been used to represent a great many things. By and large, however, the representational powers of physical models have been taken for granted in recent philosophy of science. Interest has focused on more ubiquitous and seemingly more important theoretical models, particularly those found in mathematical physics. In this paper, I focus on physical models, comparing them with theoretical models and finally with recently popular computational models. My aim is to show that the representational aspects of models used in science are fundamentally the same across all three categories of models.

1. Introduction.
Every student of scientific practices knows that physical models have long been used to represent a great many things.​[2]​ By and large, however, philosophers of science have taken for granted the representational powers of physical models. They have focused on more ubiquitous and seemingly more important theoretical models, particularly those found in mathematical physics. In this paper, I focus on physical models, comparing them first with theoretical models and finally with recently popular computational models. My aim is to show that the representational aspects of models used in science are fundamentally the same across these three categories of models.​[3]​

2. Representing with Theoretical Models.​[4]​
My paradigm of a theoretical model has been a model in classical physics, something described by a few differential equations. Canonical examples include the simple harmonic oscillator and a two-body gravitational system. The many questions that can be asked about such models include some that are ontological and others that are functional. What kind of thing are theoretical models? For what can they be used?​[5]​
	I have long thought of theoretical models as being “abstract entities” in the minimal sense of merely not being concrete (Giere 1988, 1999, 2006). A concrete simple harmonic oscillator (which neglects friction) is a physical impossibility. Because they are described using mathematics, many have assumed that such models have the status of mathematical entities, however that is to be understood (Thompson-Jones 2010). I think this is a mistake for the simple reason that theoretical models are interpreted. There is a world of difference between the number five, a mass of five gm, and a length of five cm. It is simplest, I think, to regard theoretical models as having the same ontological status as imaginary entities (Giere 2009). Whatever status that might be, it cannot be too mysterious since creating imaginary objects is something that comes naturally to evolved, language using creatures like us. A three year old child can do it. Thus, one can imagine a flying horse, though such a being is presumably physically impossible. There are even paintings and tapestries showing flying horses, just as there are drawings of simple harmonic oscillators. But there are no photographs of such.
	One of the primary functions of theoretical models, if not the primary function, is to play a role in representing aspects of the world. The question is what role they play and how they succeed in fulfilling this role. A standard account has it that theoretical models play the role of representing things in the world in the way that words and sentences are thought to represent things in the world. In the simplest case, words refer to objects or properties and sentences are true or false according to whether the designated objects exhibit the indicated properties. This simple picture does not work for theoretical models.​[6]​
 	The problem is that the model is an imaginary object that cannot exist in the real world while the thing being represented is a concrete object in the real world. The relationships of reference and truth don’t apply between two objects, one imaginary and the other concrete. And isomorphism, being a relationship between logical/mathematical structures, is not defined for such a pair. Any possible counterpart to isomorphism would presumably be some kind of perfect matching between the two objects, but that cannot be since one is physically impossible and the other actual. We are left with less well defined relationships such as similarity, resemblance, likeness, or fit. For ease of expression, I will invoke similarity, though any of the others would do as well.
	One problem is that nothing is just similar to anything else. Or, alternatively, everything is similar to everything else in some respect or other. What can be better defined is a notion of “similarity with respect to …”.  And for any given respect, one can have degrees of similarity, whether qualitative or even quantitative. So the relationship we are after could be called “selective similarity.” But what does the selecting? The imaginary and concrete objects by themselves do not pick out any particular feature with respect to which they may be said to be similar. Another problem, as is often noted (Suárez, 2003), is that (selective) similarity is a symmetrical relationship whereas representation is asymmetric.
	These difficulties can all be resolved by introducing a third element, an intentional (purposeful) agent that selects the relevant features and desired degrees of similarity, and breaks the symmetry by indicating that the imaginary object is being used to represent the concrete object. On this view, representing with theoretical models turns out to be a matter of an intentional agent using a model to represent a concrete system. Now let us see whether we reach the same conclusion regarding representing with physical models.
 
3. Representing with Physical Models.
Watson and Crick’s physical model of DNA became the iconic physical model of the twentieth century.​[7]​ Since this model was manifestly not an imaginary object, but concrete object, the ontology of physical models is different from that of theoretical models. Of course one could imagine a physical model, which would then be an imaginary object, but unlike theoretical models, it could be fully realized as a concrete physical object.​[8]​ What matters for representation, however, is not ontology but function. As for theoretical models, the question about physical models is what role they play in representation and how they succeed in fulfilling this role. So does an examination of the representational function of physical models lead us to conclusions similar to those reached for theoretical models?
	Again following standard theories of linguistic representation, it is tempting to think that the Watson and Crick model represents a DNA molecule, or, to put it more tendentiously, that there is a representational relationship between the two objects in and of themselves.  One cannot now deny that the model resembles or is similar to actual DNA molecules, that is, that there is a (strong) similarity relationship between the two objects. But again, similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation.
	That similarity is not strictly necessary even in the case of physical models is shown trivially by the fact that one can arbitrarily designate physical objects to represent other physical objects. At a pub, Crick might place two pencils in parallel pointed in opposite directions and say these represent the sugar phosphate backbone of a DNA molecule. There is some residual similarity here. But if he then places matching salt and pepper shakers next to each other between the pencils and declares that the salt shaker represents the base Adenine and the pepper Thymine, this designation is completely arbitrary. Nevertheless, I can think of no case where an established type of physical model is employed in science without being similar (in particular respects, of course) to the kind of object for which it is standardly used, as in this iconic DNA example. In fact, it turns out to be one of the virtues of focusing on physical models that they highlight the role of similarity in scientific representation, thus providing a strong contrast with linguistic representation where there is rarely any similarity between word and object. 
	From now on I will presume there is some relevant similarity between a physical model and its target. But, as has now often been remarked, similarity is also not sufficient for representation since similarity is a symmetrical relationship while representation is clearly asymmetrical. So we are again forced to consider what it takes, in addition to similarity, to establish a representational relationship between one physical object and another.
	In the case of physical models, then, it is again fairly plausible to introduce the intentions of some agent to use the model in a representational context in order to differentiate between a model merely resembling some other object and representing that object.  I have called this (somewhat tendentiously, I admit) “The Intentional Conception of Scientific Representation (Giere 2010).”​[9]​ At its most basic, the idea is that models as physical objects by themselves don’t do anything, including representing. It takes an agent to use the model to represent something. Note that this characterization of scientific representation cannot be a definition as it invokes a generalized notion of representation. I doubt that a reductive definition of so basic an activity as representing is possible.​[10]​ But more can be said.
	It requires no argument to realize that representing using physical models is selective. Not all features of a model will have counterparts in the target system and the target will have many features not represented. The Watson and Crick model had some pieces made of tin which obviously has no counterpart in a DNA molecule. We can now summarize how representing using physical models works. It works mainly by selective similarity, where the selecting is done by the agent employing the model.​[11]​ And selection is context sensitive. In some contexts it might be important to emphasize the base pairings; in others the reverse direction of the backbone.

4. Representing with Computational Models.
Philosophers of science are only gradually becoming aware of the overwhelming changes in the way science is practiced due to the employment of computers in science (Humphries 2004). The vast majority of models now used in the sciences exist primarily as computational models. Here I will examine just one example, chosen partly because it nicely fits with a discussion of physical models.
	The Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics at the Biozentrum in Basel has developed a server with information that can be used to construct models of proteins (SWISS-MODEL). They have also developed a PdbViewer (DeepView) that automatically converts information about proteins into images that can be manipulated on screen.​[12]​ One can rotate and zoom in and out to view aspects of a model. The viewer will even produce side by side images that can be seen in dramatic three dimensionality without special glasses (this takes a little practice). How are we to understand these models?
	Behind the images of protein molecules, so to speak, there is a large data base and an elaborate program which also incorporates theoretical structures. It is such things that tend to attract the interest of those who think about computational models. Indeed, scientists and philosophers often identify models themselves with equations or code. These are what one works with when constructing a model. But this identification is a category mistake. It is like identifying a description with the thing described or a definition with what is defined. In scientific practice this conceptual mistake has few consequences, but it is important to be clear about the distinction for the purpose of constructing a higher level understanding of the practice of computational modeling.
	What then is the model? Like theoretical models, it is an abstract object we can identify simply as whatever abstract object is defined by the equations and code. It is because of this easy identification that distinguishing the description of the model from the model itself has little practical importance. Since computational models are theoretical models, representing with computational models should be like representing with theoretical models. It may be said to work because intentional agents invoke selective similarities between the model and those aspects of the world represented. 
	In working with computational models, the users invoke various partial realizations of the model, including especially the visual images generated using the overall model. These are particularly important since the images function as the primary interface between the model and model users. One can think of them as two-dimensional projections of aspects of the abstract model. More controversially, I suggest we think of these images themselves as another form of physical model, easier to manipulate, perhaps, but not different in principle.
	As an intermediate step to grasping this suggestion, consider the physical models of atoms and molecules that are used in teaching chemistry. The first such “ball and stick” models were produced in the mid-nineteenth century. Modern versions can now be purchased on the open market.​[13]​ With these basic models, one can construct more complex chemical models roughly as one builds Lego structures (or objects with “tinker toys” for those of a certain age). The images produced by DeepView, then, can be thought of as pictures of model molecules constructed with these basic physical models. Just as one can turn the physical model over in one’s hands, one can rotate the image on the screen to view it from different angles. In fact, the operative features of the human visual system employed are basically the same when viewing a computer generated image and viewing a real physical model. That goes a long way toward explaining why the visual interface is so effective.
	The reasons we had for thinking that the operative relationship between physical models and their targets is selective similarity seem to apply equally well to the derived images. There are many features of proteins not represented in the computational model and even fewer represented in the constructed images. What about the role of intentional agency in making the computer images represent something in the world? Here again the case seems even stronger than for other physical models. To some extent, most physical models have a life of their own. They may, for example, sit for long periods on a shelf without being employed in any representational task. This is far less true of computer images which are constantly recreated by those using them in representational contexts. And, in active research, they are continually, and deliberately, modified to improve their representational virtues. For computer images, the users are never very far away.​[14]​
	
Conclusion.
It seems possible to develop a unified understanding of representing using three major types of models found in the sciences: theoretical, physical, and computational. In all three cases, representing involves an intentional agent selectively invoking similarities between a model and an aspect of the world. Here I have been particularly concerned to bring physical models into the fold. That has the unexpected consequence of suggesting a new way of understanding aspects of the use of computational models.
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^1	 . I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for extensive comments on a previous draft which led to this paper being reoriented as well as substantially revised.
^2	 .This practice, of course, was more common before the advent of computational modeling.
^3	 . I was moved to think more about physical models by two recent volumes: (de Chandarevian and Hopwood 2004) and (Sterrett 2006). Neither, however, emphasizes the representational role of models. 
^4	 . This section is a capsule version of (Giere 2006, Ch. 4).
^5	 . Explicit interest in ontological questions about models is relatively recent beginning with Cartwright (1999) followed by the essays in an issue of Synthese edited by Grabiele Contessa: Synthese 172(2), 2010. The papers in (Morgan and Morrison 1999) describe various functions of models other than representational ones.
^6	 . In fact, according to recent accounts of usage based linguistics such as (Tomasello 2003), this account does not work for language either. I have elaborated this point in (Giere 2010).
^7	 . Its eventual iconic status was obviously not initially recognized since the original was soon cannibalized for parts. A reconstructed version, including a few original pieces, now sits in the Science Museum in London. 
^8	 . This would be what Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) has called an “imagined concrete thing.”
^9	 . This designation is meant to provide a direct contrast with Suárez’ (2004) “Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation.” This is not the place to engage in explicit criticism of this latter conception.
^10	 . This judgment regarding the possibility of there being a reductive definition of representation is shared by Suárez (2003) and van Fraassen (2008, 7).
^11	 . This view is shared by van Fraassen (2008).
^12	 . One can get into the system at the following address: www.expasy.org/spdbv. Be sure to check out the link to a picture gallery of dramatic models.
^13	 . For example, at: www.indigo.com.
^14	 . I realize, of course, that structural chemistry provides a very favorable case for thinking of images generated from a computational model as themselves models. Clearly not all outputs (e.g., a set of measurements) are models, but once one produces an image that can be manipulated, it becomes plausible to think of that image as itself a model.
